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Android provides a standard hardware attestation system with support for alternate operating systems via allowing their verified boot key fingerprints. It's mainly used with Google's root of trust and remote key provisioning service but the API supports alternative roots of trust.

Volla's Unified Attestation is fully built on Android's hardware attestation API. It solely exists to create a centralized authority and service determining what's allowed under their control.

https://mastodon.social/@volla/116238706890314617

Volla

2026-03-16 11:51:49


🔐 Introducing: Unified Attestation
An open-source project for verifying the integrity of Android apps—as an alternative to Google's Play Integrity.

The goal is to make apps such as banking and payment apps usable on independent Android systems without relying on Google services.

We invite developers, ROM projects, and app providers to get involved.

https://uattest.net/

#Volla #VollaOS #OpenSource #software #hardware #Privacy #Security #DeGoogle

Unified Attestation

Unified Attestation is a free, open-source alternative to Google Play Integrity with offline verification and simple app + server integration.
uattest.net
GrapheneOS
Unified Attestation will permit using products from the companies involved in it while forbidding using arbitrary alternatives. They clearly aren't going to enforce reasonable security standards since their products wouldn't meet those. The whole purpose of the system is to permit their products regardless of merit and convince banking/government apps to adopt it.

There's nothing neutral or fair about a system controlled by companies approving their own products while disallowing other options.
GrapheneOS
Companies forming an anti-competitive cartel providing a service which permitting their products and while disallowing others isn't legal regardless of how they market it. It's not legal when Google does it with the Play Integrity API and it's not legal when it's Volla, Murena and iodé doing it.

We won't be participating in a system which gives these companies veto power over app compatibility on GrapheneOS. These companies will not be given the power to make arbitrary demands of GrapheneOS.
Ten wpis został zedytowany (3 miesiące temu)
GrapheneOS
We've been talking back and forth with multiple regulators over the past several years about the Play Integrity API to have action taken against it. Unified Attestation is a massive disruption to our efforts and will get in the way of having regulators take action against this. We've also been considering filing a lawsuit against Google over the Play Integrity API.

Unlike Google, the companies involved in Unified Attestation don't have massive resources to defend their anti-competitive system.
GrapheneOS
Android's standard hardware API doesn't require delegating verification to a centralized service. One or more neutral organizations could exist certifying devices and operating systems without providing a centralized API. Those organizations could simply provide signed releases with the roots of trust, revoked keys and operating system key fingerprints. Apps could use multiple different certifying organizations. This is already something Android's hardware attestation API fully supports today.
GrapheneOS
Volla, Murena and iodé are each a for-profit company selling devices. Each of them has failed to keep up with important security patches and protections. Each has marketed their products as providing a level of security they don't provide. It's very clear why these 3 companies want to be in charge of choosing which devices and operating systems people are allowed to use. They want to make sure their products are permitted and want to have an advantage over others to boost their profits.
GrapheneOS
Unified Attestation is an anti-competitive cartel turning a decentralized decision into a centralized one. Instead of neutral organizations being formed to certify devices without a massive conflict of interest, these companies will sign off on their products regardless of the level of insecurity. Multiple competing companies forming a cartel which locks out other options is not legal. We're fully willing to file one or more lawsuits over this. It should be discontinued now prior to harming us.
Ten wpis został zedytowany (3 miesiące temu)
Klaus Frank
Well on the bright side as long as they sign their own insecure crap there will always be enough vulnerabilities to break their entire vendor-lock-in system...
ṫẎℭỚ◎ᾔ ṫ◎ℳ
Thank you GOS🙏 for defending everyone’s👨‍⚖️privacy.🕵️‍♀️
GarretSidzaka
Them being easy to hack means corporations and main states can easily access GDPR or HIPAA data by purchasing it from the dark web or even "hacking themselves"
Klaus Frank
You should send all of this as a DMA complaint to the @EUCommission
@European Commission
GrapheneOS
@cutesobri It's not possible to install an Android APK without it being signed. Android's package manager performs signature verification, downgrade protection and key pinning at a lower level than the security provided by app stores. The main security app stores exist to provide is enforcing standards on the apps and bootstrapping trust through having signed metadata with downgrade protection for determining the app comes from the app store, and then the lower level system can secure it alone.
@Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
GrapheneOS
@cutesobri The primary purpose of systems such as Unified Attestation and Play Integrity is to prevent users from controlling apps. This is done by preventing using modified variants of the app or an operating system where users could control the app. The whole point of Unified Attestation is stopping users from being in control of apps. There are companies which insist on having this and there's already a standard Android hardware attestation API which can be used for it without a new system.
@Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
GrapheneOS
@cutesobri Android hardware attestation supports arbitrary roots of trust and arbitrary operating systems via permitting specific verified boot key fingerprints. Unified Attestation uses Android hardware attestation to centralize control over which roots of trust and operating systems are allowed to be used. Android hardware attestation is a far more open system where apps can use one or more sources on which devices / OSes will be allowed. Unified Attestation is designed as a power grab.
@Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
GrapheneOS
@cutesobri If apps implemented support for verifying based on Android hardware attestation, it would be easy for them to add additional sources providing a signed list of which roots should be trusted and which operating systems should be allowed. Unified Attestation could have been designed as providing signed lists for use with the standard Android attestation API. Instead, it's designed as a centralized service used instead of Android hardware attestation with arbitrary sources of trust.
@Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
RTG-powered Vel
@cutesobri system attestation checks if the system is "secure" (well, usually that's the purpose), not if the app is authentic

@GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS @Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
GrapheneOS
@risc @cutesobri It does check that the app is genuine but in order to do that it has to check that the hardware, firmware and operating system is genuine and it needs to be an operating system not permitting modifying or changing the behavior of the app in relevant ways without it being possible to detect it. The whole reason that it's verifying the hardware and OS is in order to prevent changing how the app works. Preventing the user changing the app is the focus, not protecting from malware.
@RTG-powered Vel @Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
GrapheneOS
@risc @cutesobri It's primarily promoted as protecting from malware but that's not the genuine primary purpose. It doesn't actually provide any significant protection against malware. Nearly none of the companies using it are willing to ban using devices with years of missing security patches, but they're willing to ban using alternatives. Unified Attestation is an attempt by the 3 companies involved to form a new anti-competitive, centralized system where they're the ones benefiting from it.
@RTG-powered Vel @Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
Hari Prakash
@cutesobri this makes a lot of sense, its a lot like how the SSL certs work on websites with multiple root CA. Central trusts are indeed bad no matter who does it.
@Sobri | Zoe (she/her)
Linus Kardell
>Android provides a standard hardware attestation system with support for alternate operating systems via allowing their verified boot key fingerprints.

Wouldn't that require every app to separately whitelist every OS?
GrapheneOS
@LaggyKar No, it's entirely possible to distribute a signed list of trusted roots and verified boot keys from one or more organizations. The proper approach to implementing a third party certification system for devices and operating systems would be directly using the Android hardware attestation API and distributing signed data for use with it. This would enable using multiple sources of that data and not being locked into it. An organization doing certification should still be neutral.
@Linus Kardell
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